The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Publisher’s note

with Moritz Foellmer, 'Urban societies in Europe since 1945: towards an historical interpretation', Contemporary European History , 24:4 (2015): 475-91 For with the chaotic destitution that seemed to many Russians to have been caused by the adoption of western style liberal democracy and market capitalism in the 1990s...

The Russian Empire was no more violent or rapacious than other European empires. It was less extensive than the British, on which the sun never set. And ‘the West’ has interfered in elections, overthrown governments, invaded countries and bombed civilians far more often than the Russians. The West is motivated by the best of reasons, it claims; Russians raise their eyebrows when they hear that. Some amount of anxiety is helpful — it prepares us to respond to a future threat, reminds us to take appropriate precautions and motivates us to act. of participants had COVID-Related anxiety; 39.8%, 52.55%, and 7.65% had high, medium, and low stress, respectively; Strong association between stress and anxiety Examining the perception of Russia in the West, the book begins with the assumption that Western perceptions of Russia are defined by a condition the author calls the 'Russia Anxiety', which he suggests is characterised by a cycle of exaggerated fear, disregard and then utter contempt. While he does not, in my view, satisfactorily interrogate the truthfulness of the assumption that so-called Russia Anxiety, undeniably prevalent in our modern world, is a long-standing trend that has defined previous epochs of relations, it is admittedly accurate to suggest that many seminal historical developments - to raise just a few examples, the Russia Anxiety as the proximate cause of both World War I and the Cold War - can be at least somewhat attributed to this unique conception of the Russia Anxiety, making it a condition worth examining. Nonetheless, the book must be read with a little skepticism - the author seems often to propound the view that this Russia Anxiety is a sui generis outlook that countries only employ in their assessment of Russia, yet to give just one example, British foreign policy has long been defined by its continual skepticism of Continental Europe and its mistrust of any dominant continental power. Common symptoms (concentration = 90%, overwhelmed/anxious = 84%, restless = 50%); Sources of Anxiety (academics = 80%, events proceeding as planned = 70%, achieving goals = 50%, finances = 48%); Effects of anxiety (loved one being infected = 84%, one being infected = 70%)

Then we get to the meat of the book: the five alleged charges made against Russia: of dictatorial, violent, expansionist and warmongering tendencies, and then most crucially (I felt) the relationship between Russia and Europe. With all five, he successfully shows that the received wisdom is crucially flawed in some way or other, though with a fair share of non sequiturs ("Whataboutism might sometimes be crass, making it easy for the Russia Anxiety to dismiss it out of hand. Yet the history of democracy across Europe is an unlikely story full of cynical subplots rather than an inspiring fairy tale based on the triumph of values.") Nonetheless, insightful points are made: he discusses the unique weakness of both liberal and conservative ideas as an alternative to totalitarianism in Russia, importantly singles out 1904-1953 as a uniquely painful and turbulent period of Russian history ("Tears Without End"), points out the ways in which European ideas have drawn from the Russian tradition, and not just the other way round, discusses the unique nature of the Russian Empire, in which the dominant ethnic/cultural group suffered as much as the minority, peripheral groups and cleverly undermines the traditional assumption of a warmongering Russia by instead pinpointing the Anxiety as the true cause for the emergence of these wars. The prevalence of anxiety was 53.87%; 47.85% = Mild anxiety, 23.36% = Moderate anxiety; 14.35% = moderately severe anxiety, and 1.44% = severe anxiety; Younger (< 20) and female students were more anxious

Key Publications

The researchers identified multiple protective factors that reduced stress and anxiety. The protective factors identified in the included studies included spirituality/religion, mindfulness, social support, physical activity, and knowledge about infection prevention and treatment ( 17, 26, 28, 35, 45). Association between stress and anxiety The findings on the relationship between stress and anxiety during the pandemic and RUW are important in informing the decisions on implementing coping strategies. With Rogowska et al. ( 38) reporting using task-oriented coping to effectively manage stressful events leading to increased anxiety, the findings support the current knowledge on problem-focused coping. On the other hand, Kasi et al. ( 47) found that while problem-focused coping is common among people experiencing anxiety, it does not always guarantee the expected results. The uncertainty presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the RUW implies that problem-focused coping is insufficient as one gets increasingly frustrated by developments outside their control. Nonetheless, there reeks in all of this a hint of whataboutism himself - though it is inevitable that comparative history forms the main thrust of his argument, since he is suggesting that Russia is normal and like other countries, the comparison is not always fully fleshed out, resulting in a rather tiresome exercise of "Britain and France did this too, and sometimes worse ..." in his every contestation. Perhaps a more effective approach would have been to generalise state theory, and then fit Russia within this framework to prove its normalcy, rather than to undertake the wealth of specific nation-based comparisons the author chooses to.